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THE U.N. ECONOMIC CHARTER AND U.S.
INVESTMENT AND POLICY
By G. A. ZAPHIRIOU*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations General Assembly adopted the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States (the Economic Charter)' on December 12,
1974, by a 120-6-10 vote.2 The background, the non-binding character of
the Economic Charter, and some of its provisions have been analyzed in
an article by Charles N. Brewer and John B. Tepe, Jr. which is based on
a report approved by a subcommittee of the Section of International Law
of the American Bar Association. 3
The purpose of the present analysis is:
(1) To express a further opinion on the legal effect of the Economic Charter leading to the application of some of its provisions
that truly reflect current practice.
(2) To suggest that the fundamental principle of "[f]ulfilment
in good faith of international obligations" refers to general international law and qualifies each provision of the Economic Charter
unless it is excluded by its wording.
(3) To submit, in the light of the above premises, that the Economic Charter renders support to the regulation of foreign investment and of transnational corporations in the United States, provided that bilateral treaties of friendship or conventions of establishment are observed.
(4) To demonstrate that the one-sided provision on the taking of
property contained in the Economic Charter will not help the recognition of expropriatory action but, on the contrary, will lead to
effective retaliation in the United States and in Western Europe.
(5) To refer briefly to the policy of the United States towards
nonmarket economy states as reflected in the Trade Act 1974.
* Visiting Professor of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago-Kent College of Law.
Faculty of Laws of the University of Athens, Greece (Law Degree, 1940); University of London
(LL.M., 1950). Barrister, Middle Temple, London; Advocate, Supreme Court of Greece;
Panelist, Panel of Arbitrators on International Trade and Commercial Law, American Arbitration Association. Member of the Illinois Bar.
1. See Appendix, reproducedfrom 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 251 (Jan. 1975).
2. 120 states voted in favor. Belgium, Denmark, Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, United Kingdom and United States voted against. Austria, Canada, France, Ireland,
Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway and Spain abstained.

3.

See 9 INT'L LAWYER 295 (1975).
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LEGAL EFFECT OF THE ECONOMIC CHARTER

The conservative view, as expressed by Brierly in his masterly succinct
style,' is that according to the Charter of the United Nations, 5 the General
Assembly, apart from its control over the budget, can only recommend,
initiate studies, and deliberate; and that recommendations have only a
moral effect. In practice, however, states have vested the General Assembly and the Security Council with quasi-judicial,' and possibly, quasilegislative powers that were not originally anticipated. These quasilegislative powers are described as follows by Ambassador Jorge Castafieda,7 the first Chairman of the working group that prepared the Economic
Charter:
The Assembly is the organ best suited to determine, by way of a general
pronouncement (as opposed to the function performed by the International Court of Justice in elucidating also, but by way of individualized
judgments, the nature of certain principles or rules), whether or not specific practices constitute customary law or reflect general principles of
law.
In this indirect but important manner, the General Assembly can make
a powerful contribution to the codification of international law through
the exercise of a function that might be characterized as quasi-legislative,
and that, in the future may assume even greater importance than it has
to date.
General Assembly resolutions are not binding but may have legal effects
whenever they constitute evidence of general customary international law.'
Some of the provisions of the Economic Charter are representative of modern trends, e.g., the provision on regulation of foreign investment and on
regulation and supervision of transnational corporations., Other provisions
are clearly not, e.g., the provision supporting the creation by states of
international cartels in primary commodities.10 The Economic Charter
cannot formulate new rules or change existing rules:" (1) because it lacks
the support of a substantial number of developed states and (2) because
4.
5.

J.

BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 110 (6th ed. 1963).
U.N. CHARTER, art. 9 - art. 14.

6. See Schachter, The Quasi-JudicialRole of the Security Council and the General
Assembly, 58 AM. J. INT'L L. 960 (1964).
7. Castarieda, The Underdeveloped Nations and the Development of InternationalLaw,
15 INT'L ORG. 38, 48 (1961) (emphasis in original).

8.

Asamoah, The Legal Effect of Resolutions of the General Assembly, 3 COLUM. J.

TRANSNAT'L L. 210, 214 (1965); HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH

(1963).
9. Appendix, art. 2(2)(a) and (b).
10. Appendix, art, 5.
11. But see White, A New InternationalEconomic Order, 24 INT'L. & CoMP. L.Q. 542, 552
(1975).

THE POLITICAL ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 5

U.N. ECONOMIC CHARTER

19761

the establishment of a custom requires consistent practice in time. A General Assembly resolution cannot effect an instantaneous change of international law.
A.

"Fulfilment In Good Faith Of InternationalObligations"

The above wording of fundamental (j) in chapter I raises in the context
of the Economic Charter two important questions of construction: First,
does it refer only to treaty obligations or to all obligations under general
international law and, second, does it refer only to obligations between
states or also to obligations by a state to an investing foreign enterprise.
It is arguable that the above wording is merely a restatement of the
fundamental principle of international law as expressed by the maxim
pacta sunt servanda and, therefore, restricted to treaty obligations.12 On
the other hand, it is absurd to suggest that a document emanating from
the most important international institution omitted a reference to general
international law which includes treaties, custom, and general principles
of law.' 3 In some instances a new norm of general international law may
override a treaty obligation."4 When this is the case, a liberal interpretation
would suit the declared purpose of the Economic Charter which is said to
be the formulation of new norms of international economic conduct.
Even though the word "fulfilment" points to the performance of a positive duty traditionally associated with the performance of a treaty obligation (or a contract in the sphere of private law) while a custom is traditionally associated with a duty to refrain from some action, upon closer examination the distinction is hardly valid and is based on verbal formulation.
One can say that there is a duty to refrain from violating human rights or
the right of an alien to his property, or that there is a positive duty to apply
a minimum standard to an alien and his property to be fulfilled in good
faith.
Carrying this analysis a step further, while an investment contract between a state and a foreign enterprise which is to be governed by the
domestic law of the host state and subject to the jurisidiction of its courts
does not, as such, create an international obligation, the repudiation of
such contract in bad faith by the host state may give rise to an international wrong and an international claim by the investor's state. Thus, even
by the application of the classical international law concept that an individual is merely an object of international law, fundamental (j) should be
extended to the fulfilment of obligations under general international law
12.

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 26, reproduced in 8 INT'L LEG.

MAT'LS 679, 690 (1969).
13. I.C.J. STAT., art. 38.

14.

See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 64, reproduced in 8 INT'L LEG.

MAT'LS 679, 703 (1969).
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by states towards other states and towards aliens and their property in
good faith. Moreover, the submitted interpretation would provide a fair
counter-balance to the right of a state to regulate and supervise activities
of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction under article
2(2)(b) of the Economic Charter.
It should be noted that the fulfilment in good faith of international
obligations qualifies every other provision of the Economic Charter, unless
it is excluded expressly or by implication, not only because of its fundamental importance but because of the express provision of article 33(2) of
the Economic Charter which stipulates that "each provision should be
construed in the context of the other provisions."

II.

REGULATION OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Article 2(a) of the Economic Charter provides that a state has the right
within its national jurisdiction to regulate and "exercise authority" over
foreign investment. This right is meaningless if not properly analyzed and
framed, and is limited by general international law by the application of
fundamental (j). The delimitation of the scope of "national jurisdiction"
is also a function of international law. A state may have the right to
prescribe a rule applicable to foreign investment situated (which also requires proper definition) in its territory, but it may not have a right to
enforce the prescribed rule outside its territory.
In developing states, there has been a marked change of pattern in the
domestic regulation of direct investment. The emphasis has gradually
shifted both in Latin America 5 and Africa"6 from a preferential treatment
15. See Andean Foreign Investment Code (July 17, 1971), reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG.
MAT'LS 126 (1972); Argentina: Foreign Investment Law (November 7, 1973), reproduced in
12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1489 (1973); Mexico: Law on the Registration of Contracts and Agreements Regarding the Transfer of Technology, reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'Ls 421 (1973);

Mexico; Law on Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment
(effective 1973), reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 643 (1973); Armstrong, Political Components and PracticalEffects of the Andean Foreign Investment Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1597
(1975); Oliver, The Andean ForeignInvestment Code; A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Orderas to Direct ForeignInvestment, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 (1972); Rogers, A Challenge
for U.S. Investment in Latin America: Some Unconventional Suggestions, 4 LAW & POL. IN
INT'L Bus. 557 (1972); Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin-American Foreign Investment Laws, 6 INT'L LAWYER 64 (1972); Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes:
An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL. IN INT'L Bus. 437 (1974).
16. See Organization of African Unity: Declaration on African Cooperation, Development,
and Economic Independence (May 28, 1973), reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 996 (1973);

Morocco: Laws and Decrees on Investments (August 13, 1973), reproduced in 13 INT'L LEG.
MAT'LS 406 (1974); Kalsi, Encouragement of Private Foreign Investment in the Developing
Country: Provisionsin the Laws of Kenya, 6 INT'L LAWYER 576 (1972), Donovan, Nigeria after
"Indigenization":Is There Any Room Left for the American Businessman?, 8 INT'L. LAWYER
600 (1974).
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afforded to foreign investment, to no more than national treatment'7 with
increasing local participation and control. But even under the modern
trend the host state may, and often does, grant special terms to the foreign
investor by exempting capital goods which are imported for use by the
investor from import duties and other equivalent charges, by granting tax
benefits, and, in countries that have exchange control, by granting the
right to re-export capital and profits."'
Resolution 1803 (XVII) of the General Assembly of the United Nations
of December 14, 1962,' 9 expressly provided that:
Foreign investment agreements freely entered into by or between sovereign states shall be observed in good faith. (Emphasis added.)
The change of pattern which was noticed above does not justify the
omission of a similar provision from the Economic Charter. Agreements
affording special benefits to the private investor are still common practice
even in states that pursue policies of extreme nationalism towards foreign
investment. 0
There can be no doubt that a state is not compelled to grant preferential
treatment to foreign investment, but should it freely decide to do so
because it is in need of foreign capital or technology (there is such a thing
as the reality of the market), it should be under an obligation to honor the
undertakings and guarantees that induced the foreign investment. A foreign investor, once authorized to invest in a particular state under terms,
whether legislative or contractual, is entitled to rely on the fact that these
terms will not be changed in bad faith.
If the authorization is granted by an investment agreement between the
government or proper authority of the host state and the foreign investor,
it may sometimes be possible to provide that the agreement will be governed by a law other than the law of the host state, and that disputes will
be referred to an impartial forum. Such choice of law clause, if uncoupled
with a choice of impartial forum clause, provides a relative safeguard that
the terms of the investment will not be affected by a change of legislation
in the host state. This is only a "relative safeguard" because the court of
17. This represents an application of the Calvo Doctrine which accords to aliens and their
property no more than national treatment and excludes diplomatic protection. See MEXICo
CONST. art. 27 and article 3 of the Mexican Law on the Promotion of Foreign Investment,
reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 643 (1973).
18. Many such benefits can be found in the legislatures of Greece, Korea, Sri Lanka, and
others. For a recent example, see the Argentine Foreign Investment Law, articles 4 and 5 (on
investment contracts between the foreign investor and the proper Argentine authority) and
articles 11-13, reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1489 (1973).
19. 17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17 at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
20. See remarks on investment in Mexico in Proceedings, AM. SOCIETY OF INT'L L. 63-75
(1974).
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the host state may hold that the choice of law clause is inapplicable as
being contrary to public policy.
A useful choice of law clause was inserted in the tripartite concession
agreement between Egypt, the Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation
(EGPC) and Esso which was made on December 14, 1974.21 The clause

provides that the agreement will be governed by principles common to the
law of Egypt and the law of the United States and, failing such common
principles, by principles recognized by civilized nations in general, including those that have been applied by international tribunals.
A state may be unwilling or unable (because of constitutional or other
legislative provisions) to insert in a government contract a clause referring
disputes to arbitration or, a fortiori, to a foreign jurisdiction. Taking again
as an example the agreement between Egypt, EGPC and ESSO, disputes
between Egypt and either of the two corporations are to be referred to the
jurisdiction of the Egyptian courts, whereas, disputes between EGPC and
ESSO are to be submitted to a form of international arbitration. To avoid
this difficulty, 65 states adopted the Convention on the Settlement of
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States 22 which
was prepared by a United Nations specialized agency, the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The Convention provides for
a center of arbitration to which the contracting states and their nationals
can submit in writing disputes for settlement. It was, however, opposed en
bloc by the Latin American states. If the investment agreement has no
choice of law and no clause submitting disputes to international arbitration or to a jurisdiction other than that of the courts of the host state, the
foreign investor must seek his remedies, if any, in the host state.
Section 193 of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law
of the United States expressed the principle that the breach by a state of
a contract with an alien is wrongful under international law if the breach
is effected in an arbitrary manner without a bona fide claim of excuse and
if there are no local reasonable provisions for redress. A prerequisite for the
application of this principle is that the parties contemplated when they
entered into the contract that its performance would involve, to a substantial degree, foreign commerce, use of foreign resources (or presumably
technology), or activity outside the territory of the host state. The principle
found expression in a well known arbitration award23 and is, undoubtedly,
reasonable, fair, and necessary-particularly if the maxim pacta sunt
sevanda is to be confined to contractual obligations between states.24 Con21.

Egypt-Egyptian General Petroleum Corporation - ESSO: Concession Agreement for
INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 915,
933 (July 1975).
22. [1965] 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
23. The El Triunfo Case (United States v. El Salvador), 1902 FOR. REL. U.S. 859.

Petroleum Exploration and Production, art. XXI, reproduced in 14

24.

See

BROWNLIE,

INTERNATIONAL LAW,

530-34

(1973);

O'CONNELL,

INTERNATIONAL LAW
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stitutional developments and the acceptance of the rule of law by most
developing states would, in the modern context, render the principle superfluous; but be that as it may, it should have found its place in the Economic Charter as a principle of last resort.
At a time when direct investment is increasingly carried out by means
of local subsidiaries having the nationality of the host state,15 it is vital to
stress the importance of observance of contractual obligations between
host state and foreign investor which led to the investment and the creation of the subsidiary. The subjection of persons or things (either tangible
or intangible) to the jurisdiction of the host state was effected by relying
on the guarantees that were granted. I see no value in the argument that
a foreign investor, by investing in a state, assumes the risks to which local
investors are exposed. I know of no principle of law which imposes on a
party the assumption of risk that the other party may repudiate its contractual undertakings in bad faith.
The conclusion that one can draw up to this point is that the Economic
Charter should have made it clear that fulfilment in good faith of international obligations includes obligations by states to foreign enterprises
(whether state or private) and that regulation of foreign investment is also
a concern of international law which sets a limit to state arbitrariness.
The right of a state to regulate and "exercise authority" over foreign
investment renders support to an extension or intensification of United
States control over foreign investment in the United States. Three bills,"6
in identical wording, which were introduced in the House of Representatives and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
provide for the establishment of a National Foreign Investment Control
Commission. The Commission is to prohibit any person (a) who is not a
citizen of the United States or (b) who is owned or controlled by a person
who is not a citizen of the United States from acquiring, directly or indirectly, rights, title, or interest in any voting security of any issuer, involved
in interstate commerce, if the Commission determines that such issuer is
"substantially involved in any area essential to [United States] national
security and/or economic security." The area indicated covers a wide range
including, amongst others, nuclear energy, real property to be identified
by the Commission, strategic materials, steel, fuel distribution, pharma978-84 (1970).
25. See The Barcelona Traction Case, Belgium v. Spain, [1970] I.C.J. 4, where it was
decided that the state of the shareholders' nationality has no locus standi before an international tribunal and it cannot extend diplomatic protection. The case, however, left open the
locus standi of, and the right of diplomatic protection by the state of the nationality of the
shareholders of a corporation organized and managed in the territory of the allegedly responsi-

ble state. See also Whiteman, The El Aguila Nationalization,8

DIGEST OF INT'L LAW

(1967).
26. H.R. 411, H.R. 945, H.R. 2757, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
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ceuticals, or any other field determined by the Commission (as long as any
such area remains important to United States national security and/or
economic security). The Commission is to be vested with wide powers of
inquiry and also with the power to force a sale of securities held by aliens
or alien controlled companies in order to reduce their holding to 49 per cent
or less or to deprive them of management control.
It is not my intention to construe in detail bills that may never become
law. The above is mentioned only as an instance of "exercise of authority"
that may find justification in the Economic Charter. Even though the
United States voted against the Economic Charter, it is legitimate for a
witness in a public inquiry, or counsel in an administrative or judicial
hearing to refer to the Economic Charter as providing, at least in some of
its more balanced provisions, evidence of prevailing tendencies. Also it is
proper for a court, whether state, federal, or international, to consider and
apply some provisions of the Economic Charter as constituting evidence
of a growing international custom or practice.
The bills, if they become law, would violate provisions of equal treatment (national treatment) accorded to foreign nationals and companies by
bilateral treaties or conventions of friendship or establishment unless the
proposed control by the National Foreign Investment Control Commission
can be bought under some exception provided for in the bilateral treaties.
The Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany27 and the Convention
with France,28 which are typical of other treaties of friendship and commerce, and conventions of establishment, contain a reservation that each
contracting country can determine the extent to which aliens may, within
its territory
create, control, manage or acquire interests in, enterprises engaged in
communications, air or water transport, banking involving depository or
fiduciary functions, exploitation of the soil or other material resources and
the production of electricity."9
Artical VII(2) of the Treaty with the Federal Republic of Germany and
artical VIII(3) of the Convention with France provide that each contracting
country will not intensify existing limitations on enterprises of the other
contracting party which are already engaged in the above activities.
Article XII of the Convention with France (which is, in substance, identical with article XXIV of the Treaty with Germany) provides, further, as
follows:
27. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, October 29, 1954 [19561, art.
VII(2), 7 U.S.T. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 3593.
28. Convention of Establishment, Nov. 25, 1959 [1960], art. V(2), 11 U.S.T. 2398,
T.I.A.S. No. 625.
29. Convention of Establishment, November 25, 1959 [1960], art. V(2), 11 U.S.T. 2398,
T.I.A.S. No. 625. Artical VII(2) of the German treaty is, in substance, identical.
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The provisions of the present Convention shall not preclude the application of measures:
(a) regulating the importation and exportation of gold and silver;
(b) regarding fissionable materials, the radio-active by-products of the
utilization or manufacture of such materials, or raw materials which are
the source of fissionable materials;
(c) regulating the manufacture of and traffic in arms, munitions and
implements of war, as will as traffic in other materials carried on directly
or indirectly for the purpose of supplying military establishments;
(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential security interests.
The Treaty and Convention provisions relating to national treatment
and to the above reservation and limitations raise a number of interesting
questions of construction. First, are they to be construed strictly or liberally? Second, can a fundamental change in circumstances which was not
foreseen by the parties (e.g., technological change or the international
cartelization of oil) be invoked by the United States for the termination
or suspension of certain obligations under the Treaty or Convention, or at
least as a justification for a wider interpretation of the above reservations?
Third, do measures for the protection of "security interests" in the context
of the relevant provisions of the Treaty and Convention include "economic
security"?
There is very little international and national precedent on the above
matters with the exception of a decision of the U.S. Supreme Court which
held that provisions in treaties of friendship and commerce
are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit and, when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights that may be claimed
under it
3 °
and the other favorable to them, the latter is to be preferred.
The rights referred to in the above decision are rights to national treatment and, consequently, reservations of the contracting countries to limit
such rights must be construed strictly.
Change of circumstances has never been applied by an international
tribunal or a U.S. court to determine the validity or even the interpretation
of a treaty or convention. The principle, however, which is expressed by
the maxim rebus sic standibus, exists and may well be applied in the
future.
In my opinion the expression "security interests" should be construed
widely and should include "economic security." In some areas it is impossible to distinguish between military and economic security, e.g., the en30.
(1924).

Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342, 44 S.Ct. 515, 516, 68 L. Ed. 1041, 1044
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ergy industry. A fourth Bill, 3' which was introduced in the House of Representatives and referred to the Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, deals with the prevention of control by foreign persons of United
States companies engaged in the energy or defence industry and falls
clearly within this exception.
III.

REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS

The provisions in article 2(2)(b) of the Economic Charter have now
become common ground. It is now generally accepted that the activities
of transnational corporations should be regulated. Transnational corporations are not entitled to interfere in the internal affairs of the host state or
in general become involved in local politics unless their activity constitutes
legitimate lobbying. It is obvious that they must abide with the laws and
3
regulations of the host state. 1
A United Nations Commission on Transnational Corporations appointed by the Economic and Social Council is drafting an international
code of conduct for transnational corporations. No doubt, the committee
will delineate the spheres of competence between home and host country
to regulate the activities of transnational corporations. It will be important
to consider the impact of international law, the obligation on the host state
not to discriminate between transnational corporations, to accord them as
near a national treatment as is possible under the concrete economic circumstances, and also, to treat them fairly and to honor contractual undertakings.
IV.

THE RIGHT To TAKE FOREIGN PROPERTY

Article 2(2)(c) of the Economic Charter provides that a state has the
right to take foreign property so long as appropriate compensation is paid,
taking into account the relevant laws and regulations of the taking state
and "all circumstances that the State considers pertinent."3 This provision should again be contrasted with the declaration of the relevant principles in Resolution 1803 (XVII) of December 14, 1962:11
Nationalization, expropriation or requisitioning shall be based on grounds
or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest which are
31.

H.R. 4677, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).

32. See Report of the Group of Eminent Persons on The Impact of MultinationalCorporations on Development and on International Relations, U.N. publication E/5500/Rev. 1
ST/ESA/6, 1974, 14, 39, 40, 46; Multinational Corporations in World Development, U.N.
publication ST/ECA. 190, 1973: Hearings before the Group of Eminent Persons, U.N. publi-

cation ST/ESA/15, 1974; Kissinger Address of September 1,1975, read by Moynihan, the U.S.
Representative to the United Nations, 73 DEP'T OF STATE BULL. 425, 432-33.
33.

Appendix, art. 2(2)(c).

34.

17 U.N. GAOR Supp. 17 at 15, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962).
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recognized as overriding purely individual or private interests, both domestic and foreign. In such cases, the owner shall be paid appropriate
compensation, in accordance with the rules in force in the state taking
such measures in the exercise of its sovereignty and in accordance with
international law. In any case, where the question of compensation
gives rise to controversy, the national jurisdiction of the state taking such
measures shall be exhausted. However, upon agreement by sovereign
states and other parties concerned, settlement of the dispute should be
made through arbitration or international jurisdiction.
The declared principles were accepted both by developed and developing
states (ironically including Chile) and, although a number of takings and
adjudications took place during the 13 years that elapsed between Resolution 1803 and the Economic Charter, they provide no basis for the drastic
departure from the text of Resolution 1803.
Resolution 1803 laid down the prerequisites that justify a taking or requisitioning (which is merely a transfer of use for a limited period rather
than an outright transfer of ownership). They are: (i) the existence of some
reason of public utility, security or national interests and (ii) the payment
of compensation appropriate, according to domestic law and international
law. Prerequisite (i), which is a reflection on the international plane of a
provision frequently found in constitutions and domestic legislations, expresses also, indirectly, the widely accepted principle of international law
that the taking must not be discriminatory. 5 Lack of discrimination was
invoked and stressed by the government of Chile in the copper nationalization. 6 Discrimination by Libya was invoked by British Petroleum in the
nationalization of its share in the Libyan nationalization case." It cannot
be seriously doubted that it is a basic requirement of international law.
There can also be no doubt that the payment of compensation is a basic
requirement of international law and the Economic Charter duly incorporated it. But difficulties arise when one attempts to determine the measure
of compensation. The use of the proper adjective cannot provide the
solution. There are, perhaps, linguistic differences between "fair" (or
"just"), "appropriate" or "adequate." "Fair" (or "just") emphasizes judicial discretion; "appropriate" is, perhaps, slightly tilted in favor of administrative discretion, and "adequate" implies the existence of a minimum
measure. Traditionally, the concern of international law is to provide a
35. BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 523-24 (1973); O'CONNELL, INTERNATIONAL LAW 776-77,
780 (1970).
36. Vicuia, Some InternationalLaw Problems Posed by the Nationalizationof the Copper Industry by Chile, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 711 (1973); see also observations as to the application
of the principle by Seidl-Hohenveldern, Chilean CopperNationalizationcases Before German
Courts, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 110, 113 (1975).
37. Haight, The Libyan Nationalization of British Petroleum Company Assets, 6 INT'L
LAWYER

541 (1972).
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minimum standard of conduct for the protection of aliens and their property. International law and international tribunals cannot and should not
be concerned with internal policies and internal political expediency which
are important factors for the domestic determination of the appropriate
compensation. On the other hand, the function of international law and
international adjudication is to ensure that the alien is adequately compensated for the taking of his property. Authority can be found in a widely
cited decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice that "fair"
compensation, which would render an expropriation of foreign property
lawful under international law, equals the value of expropriated property
at the time of the taking, plus interest up to the time of payment."
The Economic Charter, by departing from the relevant wording of Resolution 1803 and accepted principles of international law, adopted the Soviet view (which was rejected during the drafting of Resolution 1803) that
fhe appropiateness of compensation is a matter to be determined according
to the national law of the taking State.3 9 In fact, the Economic Charter
went further by referring to "all the circumstances that the State considers
pertinent,"40 thus introducing a wide legislative or administrative discretion difficult to challenge in any court of law.
. The second sentence of article 2(2)(c) of the Economic Charter, which
provides for a hearing as to the amount of the compensation before the
domestic tribunals of the taking state or before an international tribunal
if otherwise freely agreed by states concerned, is of little help since the
matter will have to be determined according to the domestic law of the
taking state and in light of all circumstances that the state considers
pertinent. If, for instance, the taking state considers that excess profits
above x percent per annum realized during years preceding the date of
nationalization should, under the circumstances, be deducted from the
amount of the compensation, there appears to be very little room left for
judicial discretion and no room at all for the application of a minimum
international standard.
The basic defect of article 2(2)(c) is that it attempts to exclude the
application of international law, both as to the legality of the taking and
as to the appropriateness of compensation. International law renders illegal the taking of foreign property which is based on discrimination or
confiscation (by payment of a nominal compensation), and defines the
limits of national jurisdiction within which expropriation or nationalization can legally be effected. It is interesting to note that sub-paragraph (c)
of article 2, unlike sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), does not refer to "national
jurisdiction." We shall see below, when discussing the challenge to title in
38.
39.
40.

Chorzow Factory Case, P.C.I.J. Ser. A, Nos. 7, 9, 17, 19 (1926-29).
U.N. Doc. A AC .97/SR .32 at 7-8 (1961).
Appendix, art. 2(2)(c).
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domestic litigation, that English law recognizes only expropriations affecting property situated in the territory of the expropriating state and that
the position is very similar in the Federal Republic of Germany, France,
Italy, and Japan. In the United States a comparable result is achieved by
applying the act of state doctrine (which precludes the examination of the
legality of the taking) only to the taking by a foreign sovereign of property
within his territory.4 United States law, however, unlike English law, appears to recognize that a state, also, has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of
law as to an interest of a national irrespective of the situation of the subject
42
matter to which the interest relates.
The Economic Charter attempts to exclude the application of international minimum standards, diplomatic protection, 3 and even to limit the
application of international law by an international tribunal. Article 42 of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States
and Nationals of other States provides that if the parties have failed to
agree on an applicable law, the tribunal shall apply the law of the host
state (including its rules on the conflict of laws) and "such rules of international law as may be applicable."" If the Economic Charter is declaratory
or formative of international law, customary international law has abdicated the function to determine whether the taking by a state of foreign
property is legal and what, under the circumstances, is just compensation.
V.

CHALLENGE To TITLE AND RETALIATION

The submission of investment claims to international arbitration and
the application of international law would ensure an impartial regulation
of investment disputes. The attempt of the Economic Charter to exclude
or limit the use of international adjudicatory machinery and the application of international law (which provides objective and evolving rules not
subject to arbitrary change by the host state), are bound to drive the
foreign investor, who found no local satisfaction of his claim, to the use of
other means. A common method used in the past was the attachment by
the alleged owner of movable property found outside the territory of the
expropriating state.
The present position in the United States is that a court (either federal
or state) will examine the legality of the alleged acquisition of title or other
right in property by a state (or a party claiming under it) which is in
41. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed.2d 804
(1964).
42.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §30(1) (b)
(1962). Republic of Iraq v. First Nat'l City Bank, 353 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1965).
43. Lillich, The Diplomatic Protection of Nationals Abroad; An Elementary Principleof
InternationalLaw Under Attack, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 359 (1975).

44.

[19651 17 U.S.T. 1270, T.I.A.S. No. 6090, 575 U.N.T.S. 159.
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violation of principles of international law, unless the President of the
United States determines that the application of the act of state doctrine
(which precludes the examination of the legality of the taking) is required
in the particular case.4 5 The principles of international law, as understood
in the United States, require that in cases of nationalization or expropriation a reasonable provision be made for the determination and payment
of an adequate, effective, and reasonably prompt compensation. 4 Conflicts
are, therefore, bound to arise between the determination of the legality of
the expropriation and of the proper compensation by the tribunals of the
taking state which are only bound (according to the Economic Charter) by
their national laws and policies and the determination by the United
States courts (which will decide these matters according to international
law and their own public policy). Anticipated changes in sovereign immunity and service of process, together with the possibility in certain states (of
the United States) of conferring jurisdiction to a court by attachment of
assets, may give rise in the future to contractual or tortuous claims against
expropriating states.47
In the United Kingdom, the tendency is to treat the acquisition of property by an expropriating state according to principles of private rather than
public international law. Acquisition by a state of property situated in its
territory by ad hoc legislation is recognized in England, 4 unless such application of the lex situs is contrary to English public policy and/or principles
of international law as incorporated into the law of England.49 The Economic Charter will provide some argument that international law has
changed since the decision in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate,50 but this
will not prevent an English court from excluding the application of the lex
situs on grounds of public policy if the expropriation violates international
law as understood in England. Furthermore, as was submitted above, the
Economic Charter has no formative effect.
The approach in Germany, 5 Italy, 5 and Japan" is very similar to the
45. Sabbatino Amendment (Second Hickelooper), 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2) (Supp. 1976).
46. RESTATEMENT, note 42 supra at §190-95; 22 U.S.C.A. §2370(e)(1) and (2) (Supp. 1976).
47. See Chemical Natural Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Venezuela, 420 Pa. 134, 215 A.
2d 864 (1966), where an action of assumpsit was commenced by a writ of foreign attachment.
48. Jabbour v. Custodian of Absentees Property of the State of Israel [1954] 1 All E.R.
145; Bank voor Handel en Sheepvaart N.V. v. Slatford [1953] 1 Q.B. 248; Princess Paley
Olga v. Weisz [1929] 1 K.B. 718; Luther v. Sagor [19211 3 K.B. 532; Helbert Wagg & Co.

[19561 1 Ch. 323;

ZAPHIRIOU, TRANSFER OF CHATTELS IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW

117-27

(1956).
49. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Jaffrate [1953] 1 W.L.R. 246; 20 Int'l L. Rep. 316 (1953)
(decision of the Aden Supreme Court of 1953 applying English conflict of laws rules).
50. Id.
51. See SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONALES KONFISKATION-UND ENTEIGNUNGSRECHT
(1952). See also Seidl-Hohenvelders, note 36 supra at 110-19; Decision of the Bremen Superior
Court (1959) in 90 J. Droit Int'l 1127 (1963); Decisions of the Hamburg Superior Court,
reproduced in 12 INT'L LEG. MAT'L 251 (1973) and 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1115 (1974).
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approach in the United Kingdom, although in all three countries the courts
tend to rely more on principles of public international law than the English
courts. Both the Civil Court of Rome and the High Court of Tokyo, in the
Anglo-Iranian Cases,5" referred to the General Assembly Resolution 626
(VII) of December 21, 1952, adopted less than a month after the date of
the Iranian nationalization law which dealt with the right of a state to
exploit its own natural resources.
French courts examine the payment of compensation in order to recognize title acquired by a foreign state through expropriation. Earlier French
decisions insisted on the payment of compensation which was both just
and prompt (in fact, pre-assessed, "pr~alable"). Decisions after the second
world war, in view of the wide-spread nationalization both inside and
outside France and the violation by the French government of article 545
of the Civil Code (which requires a just and pre-assessed compensation),
were satisfied if the foreign expropriatory legislation provided for the pay55
ment of reasonable compensation.
When Libya in 1971 nationalized the interest of British Petroleum Exploration Company (Libya) Ltd. in a Libyan oilfield covered by a concession agreement, B.P. attempted to claim ownership of oil that originated
from the oilfield. This attempt failed on the ground that the oil had been
extracted by the Arabian Gulf Exploration Company after nationalization
and that, consequently, B.P. could not claim title in the oil. The decision
rested on the narrow ground that according to Libyan law all petroleum
lying in the Libyan subsoil in its natural state is deemed to be the property
of the Libyan state and that since this particular oil was not extracted by
B.P., the company could not claim title to it. 51Similar attempts by Kennecott Copper Corporation in Paris, Rotterdam and Hamburg, through its
dissolved subsidiary Braden Copper Company and Braden's transferee,
the Sociedad Minera El Teniente, to claim title in copper extracted from
the nationalized El Teniente mine in Chile, also failed, though on different
grounds of corporation law and procedure. 7
52.

B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Astro Protector Compania Naviera S.A., Court of

Syracusa (1973), reproduced in 13

INT'L

LEG. MAT'LS

106 (1974); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v.

S.U.P.O.R. Co., Court Of Venice (1953), 22 Int'l L. Rep. 19 (1955); Anglo-Iranian Oil Co.
v. S.U.P.O.R. Co., Civil Court of Rome (1954), 22 Int'l L. Rep. 23 (1955).
53. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. v. Idemitsu Kosan Kabushiki Kaisha, Dist. Ct. of Tokyo [Civil
Ninth Division], 1953; High Ct. of Tokyo [First Civil Affairs Section], 1953, 20 Int'l L. Rep.
305 (1957).
54. See notes 52 and 53 supra.
55. See BATIFFOL ET LAGARDE, 2 DROIT PRIV9 INTERNATIONAL, 150, 151 (5th ed., 1971), with

extensive citations of decisions of the French courts;

NIBOYET, JOURNAL DE DROIT INTERNA-

288 (1929);
885-88 (1969).
56. B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) v. Astro Protector Campania Naviera S.A., Court of
Syracusa (1973), reproduced in 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 106 (1974).
57. 77 REVUE G9N9RALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC 499-502 (1973). See interlocutory

TIONAL PRIVY,

674 (1928) and

REVUE CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE,

CHARLES ROUSSEAU, REVUE GENERALE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC
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Even though claims to products extracted from nationalized mines and
oil fields were not always successful, the provisional attachments which
preceded the investigation of title impeded their world-wide trading and
gave rise to protests and difficulties until, ultimately, a compromise was
reached on the payment of compensation. In addition to judicial measures
taken by enterprises from the recovery of expropriated property, states
resort to measures of retaliation for the protection of their nationals. The
first Hickenlooper Amendment and the Gonzalez Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act 58 are typical examples of legislative authority authorizing the President of the United States to take steps in retaliation for injury
by expropriations, or other similar measures, against property and interests of U.S. citizens and U.S. controlled business associations abroad. The
first Hickenlooper Amendment provides for the cutting of aid to the expropriating state; the Gonzalez Amendment for the use of the voting power
of the United States in an international organization against such state.
The Economic Charter, by making clear that international law governs
the legality of the taking and by setting a minimum standard of compensation, would have contributed to the avoidance of measures that impede
international trade and would have improved the security of investments
as a means to international economic develoment. As it now stands, it will,
inevitably, lead to the following results:
(1) Circumvention of the Economic Charter by specific provisions in bilateral treaties that the property of nationals and business associations of one contracting state within the territory of the
other contracting state can only be expropriated for a public purpose and with prompt payment of compensation representing the
equivalent of the property taken and in effectively realizable
form .5"
(2) Avoidance of investment in a state with which there is no
bilateral treaty, to the detriment of unsponsored investment and
trading from which both developing and communist states have
benefitted greatly.
(3) Preference to enter into joint ventures with no transfer of
capital or equity holding in the host state.
(4) Preference to deal with communist states where there is no
private property than with a developing state with a private property system.
decision of the Supreme Court of Hamburg of March 13, 1974 in favor of Sociedad Minera
El Teniente on a point of procedure, reproduced in in 13 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1115 (1974).
58. 22 U.S.C.A. §§284j, 2370(e)(1) (Supp. 1976).
59. See Convention of Establishment Between the United States and France, November
25, 1959 [1959], art. IV, 11 U.S.T. 2398, 401 U.N.T.S. 75; Treaty of Friendship, Establishment, and Navigation Between the United States and Belgium, February 21, 1961 [19611,
art. IV, 14 U.S.T. 1284, 480 U.N.T.S. 149.

1976]

U.N. ECONOMIC CHARTER

(5) Challenges to title.
(6) Contractual and tortious claims relating to expropriation
that will be made effective by anticipated changes both in the
United States and in Western Europe in sovereign immunity, service of process on foreign governments and enforcement against
assets owned by foreign states, state enterprises or state controlled
enterprises.
VI.

TRADING WITH NONMARKET ECONOMIES

Article 4 of the Economic Charter is representative of present trends. No
state is subject to discrimination of any kind based solely on differences
in political, economic, or social systems. Development of trade between the
United States and the communist world has been slower than that between
other non-communists states and the communist world. In 1973, the value
of U.S. trade was calculated to be less than 10 percent of the value of trade
between other non-communist countries and the communist countries of
Eastern Europe. 0
The Trade Act of 1974 has made the conclusion of a commercial treaty,
the granting of most-favored-nation treatment, and the extension of credits or guarantees, or investment guarantees to nonmarket economy countries, conditional on the liberalization of their immigration laws.' The
liberalization of immigration as a precondition for the lifting of discrimination against products of nonmarket economies accords with fundamental
(k) in Chapter I of the Economic Charter which provides for the respect of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The Universal Declaration of
Human Rights" in article 13(2) provides; "Everyone has the right to leave
any country, including his own and to return to his country."
The first trade agreement to be signed and to be transmitted to Congress
for approval under the Trade Act 1974 and the procedure of §407 is the
agreement with Romania of April 2, 1975.3 The granting of nondicriminatory treatment to products of the Peoples Republic of China is awaiting
the full diplomatic recognition of that country by the United States.
Trade with nonmarket economies raises purely economic difficulties
which are unrelated to human rights and political considerations. They
concern subsidization and dumping by nonmarket economies. Subsidization by the state is inherent in a system in which means of production are
60. 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 7788.
61. 19 U.S.C.A. §2432 (Supp. 1975). See §2433 as to similar treatment of nonmarket
economy countries not cooperating with the United States on matters relating to U.S. military and civil personnel in Southeast Asia.
62. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/180 at 71 (1948).
63. Agreement on Trade Relations between Romania and the United States, reproduced
in 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 671 (1975).
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owned by the state. Dumping (i.e., the introduction of products of one
country into the commerce of another country at less than the normal
value of the products) cannot be easily detected. Furthermore, antitrust
provisions which increasingly apply to foreign commerce between market
economies do not apply to state monopolies.64 The realization of these
differences that exist between market and nonmarket economies has led
to the introduction of necessary safeguards and procedures in the U.S.
trade agreements with the U.S.S.R. 5 and Romania." These safeguards and
procedures consist in joint consultations and examination of the relevant
factors and the taking of preventive or other measures found to be necessary to avoid market disruption. A corresponding section, dealing with
market disruption caused by the importation of a product from a communist country, was included in the Trade Act 1974.7
VII.

CONCLUSION

The Economic Charter cannot formulate new rules or change existing
rules of international law because it lacks the support of a substantial
number of developed states. A General Assembly resolution cannot, in any
event, effect an instantaneous change of international law; the establishment of a custom requires consistent practice in time. Some of the provisions of the Economic Charter are representative of modern trends.
The fundamental principle in the Economic Charter which calls for
fulfilment in good faith of international obligations refers to general international law and qualifies each provision of the Economic Charter unless
it is excluded by its wording.
The right of a state to regulate foreign investment and activities of
transnational corporations supports a United States policy of control of
foreign investment, provided such policy does not violate bilateral treaties
of friendship or conventions of establishment.
Article 2(2)(c) of the Economic Charter, which refers to nationalization,
expropriation and other takings, should be amended so as to make clear
that it is subject to the fundamental duty of a state to fulfill its obligations
under general international law in good faith and that the payment of
compensation must satisfy international minimum standards. Lack of
clarification in this field will be detrimental to international trade, will
lead to retaliation and to effective claims against expropriating states,
64. See T. Sorensen, Most-Favored-Nation and Less-Favored Nations, 52 FOREIGN
AFFAIRS 273 (1974), R. Vernon, Apparatchiks and Entrepreneurs: U.S. Soviet Economic
Relations, 52 FOREIGN AFFAIRS 249 (1974).

65. Art. 3 and Annex 1, reproduced in 11 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 1321, 1324-25 (1972).
66. Art. 3 and Annex 1, reproduced in 14 INT'L LEG. MAT'LS 671, 674 (1975).
67. Section 2436 provides for an investigation by the International Trade Commission and
for necessary action to be taken by the President of the United States.
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state enterprises, or state controlled enterprises.
The current trend which is followed by the United States policy, is in
favor of trading between countries with different economic, political, or
social systems. It should, however, be borne in mind that economic considerations may justify, in certain cases, the taking of measures by a market
economy country against market disruptions caused by a nonmarket economy country.
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APPENDIX
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
RESOLUTION 3281 (XXIX)
The General Assembly,
Recalling that the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, in its resolution 45 (III) of 18 May 1972, stressed the urgency to
establish generally accepted norms to govern international economic relations systematically and recognized that it is not feasible to establish a just
order and a stable world as long as the Charter to protect the rights of all
countries, and in particular the developing States, is not formulated,
Recalling further that in the same resolution it was decided to establish
a Working Group of governmental representatives to draw up a draft
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, which the General Assembly, in it resolution 3037 (XXVII) of 19 December 1972, decided should
be composed of forty Member States,
Noting that, in its resolution 3082 (XXVIII) of 6 December 1973, it
reaffirmed its conviction of the urgent need to establish or improve norms
of universal application for the development of international economic
relations on a just and equitable basis and urged the Working Group on
the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States to complete, as the
first step in the codification and development of the matter, the elaboration of a final draft Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, to
be considered and approved by the General Assembly at its twenty-ninth
session,
Bearing in mind the spirit and terms of its resolutions 3201 (S-VI) and
3202 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974, containing the Declaration and the Programme
-of Action on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
which underlined the vital importance of the Charter to be adopted by the
General Assembly at its twenty-ninth session and stressed the fact that the
Charter shall constitute an effective instrument towards the establishment
of a new system of international economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and inter-dependence of the interests of developed and developing countries,
Having examined the report of the Working Group on the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States on its fourth session, transmitted
to the General Assembly by the Trade and Development Board at its
fourteenth session,
Expressing its appreciationto the Working Group on the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States which, as a result of the task performed in its four sessions held between February 1973 and June 1974,
assembled the elements required for the completion and adoption of the
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Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States at the twenty-ninth
session of the General Assembly, as prevsiously recommended,
Adopts and solemnly proclaims the following charter:
CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES
PREAMBLE
The General Assembly,
Reaffirming the fundamental purposes of the United Nations, in particular the maintenance of international peace and security, the development
of friendly relations among nations and the achievement of international
co-operation in solving international problems in the economic and social
fields,
Affirming the need for strengthening international co-operation in these
fields,
Reaffirming further the need for strengthening international cooperation for development,
Declaring that it is a fundamental purpose of the present Charter to
promote the establishment of the new international economic order, based
on equity, sovereign equality, interdependence, common interest and cooperation among all States, irrespective of their economic and social systems,
Desirous of contributing to the creation of conditions for:
(a) The attainment of wider prosperity among all countries and of
higher standards of living for all peoples,
(b) The promotion by the entire international community of the economic and social progress of all countries, especially developing countries,
(c) The encouragement of co-operation, on the basis of mutual advantage and equitable benefits for all peace-loving States which are willing to
carry out the provisions of the present Charter, in the economic, trade,
scientific and technical fields, regardless of political, economic or social
systems,
(d) The overcoming of main obstacles in the way of the economic development of the developing countries,
(e) The acceleration of the economic growth of developing countries
with a view of bridging the economic gap between developing and developed countries,
(f) The protection, preservation and enhancement of the environment,
Mindful of the need to establish and maintain a just and equitable
economic and social order through:
(a) The achievement of more rational and equitable international economic relations and the encouragement of structural changes in the world
economy,
(b) The creation of conditions which permit the futher expansion of
trade and intensification of economic co-operation among all nations,
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(c) The strenghtening of the economic independence of developing
countries,
(d) The establishment and promotion of international economic relations, taking into account the agreed differences in development of the
developing countries and their specific needs,
Determined to promote collective economic security for development, in
particular of the developing countries, with strict respect for the sovereign
equality of each State and through the co-operation of the entire international community.
Considering that genuine co-operation among States, based on joint
consideration of and concerted action regarding international economic
problems, is essential for fulfilling the international community's common
desire to achieve a just and rational development of all parts of the world,
Stressing the importance of ensuring appropriate conditions for the conduct of normal economic relations among all states, irrespective of differences in social and economic systems, and for the full respect for the rights
of all peoples, as well as strengthening instruments of international economic co-operation as means for the consolidation of peace for the benefit
of all,
Convinced of the need to develop a system of international economic
relations on the basis of sovereign equality, mutual and equitable benefit
and the close interrelationship of the interests of all States,
Reiterating that the responsibility for the development of every country
rests primarily upon itself but that concomitant and effective international
co-operation is an essential factor for the full achievement of its own development goals,
Firmly convinced of the urgent need to evolve a substantially improved
system of international economic relations,
Solemnly adopts the present Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States.
CHAPTER I
Fundamentalsof international economic relations
Economic as well as political and other relations among States shall be
governed, inter alia, by the following principles:
(a) Sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of
States;
(b) Sovereign equality of all States;
(c) Non-aggression;
(d) Non-intervention;
(e) Mutual and equitable benefit;
(f) Peaceful coexistence;
(g) Equal rights and self-determination of peoples;
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(h) Peaceful settlement of disputes;
(i) Remedying of injustices which have been brought about by force
and which deprive a nation of the natural means necessary for its normal
development;
(j) Fulfilment in good faith of international obligations;
(k) Respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms;
(1) No attempt to seek hegemony and spheres of influence;
(m) Promotion of international social justice;
(n) International co-operation for development;
(o) Free access to and from the sea by land-locked countries within the
framework of the above principles.
CHAPTER II
Economic rights and duties of States
Article 1
Every State has the sovereign and inalienable right to choose its economic system as well as its political, social and cultural systems in accordance with the will of its people, without outside interference, coercion or
threat in any form whatsoever.
Article 2
1. Every State has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty,
including possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources and economic activities.
2. Each State has the right:
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign investment within
its national jurisdiction in accordance with its laws and regulations and in
conformity with its national objectives and priorities. No State shall be
compelled to grant preferential treatment to foreign investment;
(b) To regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations within its national jurisdiction and take measures to ensure that such
activities comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform with its
economic and social policies. Transnational corporations shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a host State. Every State should, with full
regard for its sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the exercise
of the right set forth in this subparagraph;
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property in which case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State
adopting such measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case
where the question of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be
settled under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States concerned that
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other peaceful means be sought on the basis of the sovereign equality of
States and in accordance with the principle of free choice of means.
Article 3
In the exploitation of natural resources shared by two or more countries,
each State must co-operate on the basis of a system of information and
prior consultations in order to achieve optimum use of such resources
without causing damage to the legitimate interest of others.
Article 4
Every State has the right to engage in international trade and other
forms of economic co-operation, irrespective of any differences in political,
economic and social systems. No State shall be subjected to discrimination
of any kind based solely on such differences. In the pursuit of international
trade and other forms of economic cooperation, every State is free to choose
the forms of organization of its foreign economic relations and to enter into
bilateral and multilateral arrangements consistent with its international
obligations and with the needs of international economic co-operation.
Article 5
All States have the right to associate in organizations of primary commodity producers in order to develop their national economies, to achieve
stable financing for their development and, in pursuance of their aims, to
assist in the promotion of sustained growth of the world economy, in particular accelerating the development of developing countries. Correspondingly all States have the duty to respect that right by refraining from
applying economic and political measures that would limit it.
Article 6
It is the duty of States to contribute to the development of international
trade of goods, particularly by means of arrangements and by the conclusion of long-term multilateral commodity agreements, where appropriate,
and taking into account the interests of producers and consumers. All
States share the responsibility to promote the regular flow and access of
all commercial goods traded at stable, remunerative and equitable prices,
thus contributing to the equitable development of the world economy,
taking into account, in particular, the interests of developing countries.
Article 7
Every State has the primary responsibility to promote the economic,
social and cultural development of its people. To this end, each State has
the right and the responsibility to choose its means and goals of develop-
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ment, fully to mobilize and use its resources, to implement progressive
economic and social reforms and to ensure the full participation of its
people in the process of benefits of development. All States have the duty,
individually and collectively, to co-operate in order to eliminate obstacles
that hinder such mobilization and use.
Article 8
States should co-operate in facilitating more rational and equitable international economic relations and in encouraging structural changes in
the context of a balanced world economy in harmony with the needs and
interests of all countries, especially developing countries, and should take
appropriate measures to this end.
Article 9
All States have the responsibility to co-operate in the economic, social,
cultural, scientific and technological fields for the promotion of economic
and social progress throughout the world, especially that of the developing
countries.
Article 10
All States are juridically equal and, as equal members of the international community, have the right to participate fully and effectively in the
international decision-making process in the solution of world economic,
financial and monetary problems, inter alia, through the appropriate international organizations in accordance with their existing and evolving rules,
and to share equitably in the benefits resulting therefrom.
Article 11
All States should co-operate to strengthen and continuously improve the
efficiency of international organizations in implementing measures to
stimulate the general economic progress of all countries, particularly of
developing countries, and therefore should co-operate to adapt them, when
appropriate, to the changing needs of international economic co-operation.
Article 12
1. States have the right, in agreement with the parties concerned, to
participate in subregional, regional and interregional co-operation in the
pursuit of their economic and social development. All States engaged in
such co-operation have the duty to ensure that the policies of those groupings to which they belong correspond to the provisions of the present
Charter and are outward-looking, consistent with their international obligations and with the needs of international economic co-operation and
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have full regard for the legitimate interests of third countries, especially
developing countries.
2. In the case of groupings to which the States concerned have transferred or may transfer certain competences as regards matters that come
within the scope of the present Charter, its provisions shall also apply to
those groupings, in regard to such maters, consistent with the responibilities of such States as members of such groupings. Those states shall cooperate in the observance by the groupings of the provisions of this
Charter.
Article 13
1. Every State has the right to benefit from the advances and developments in science and technology for the acceleration of its economic and
social development.
2. All States should promote international scientific and technological
co-operation and the transfer of technology, with proper regard for all
legitimate interests including, inter alia, the rights and duties of holders,
suppliers and recipients of technology. In particular, all States should
facilitate the access of developing countries to the achievements of modern
science and technology, the transfer of technology and the creation of
indigenous technology for the benefit of the developing countries in forms
and in accordance with procedures which are suited to their economies and
their needs.
3. Accordingly, developed countries should co-operate with the
developing countries in the establishment, strengthening and development
of their scientific and technological infrastructures and their scientific research and technological activities so as to help expand and transform the
economies of developing countries.
4. All States should co-operate in research exploring with a view to
evolving further internationally accepted guidelines or regulations for the
transfer of technology, taking fully into account the interests of developing
countries.
Article 14
Every State has the duty to co-operate in promoting a steady and increasing expansion and liberalization of world trade and an improvement
in the welfare and living standards of all peoples, in particular those of
developing countries. Accordingly, all States should co-operate, inter alia,
towards the progressive dismantling of obstacles to trade and the improvement of the international framework for the conduct of world trade and,
to these ends, co-ordinated efforts shall be made to solve in an equitable
way the trade problems of all countries taking into account the specific
trade problems of the developing countries. In this connexion, [sic] States
shall take measures aimed at securing additional benefits for the interna-
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tional trade of developing countries so as to achieve a substantial increase
in their foreign exchange earnings, the diversification of their exports, the
acceleration of the rate of growth of their trade, taking into account their
development needs, an improvement in the possibilities for these countries
to participate in the expansion of world trade and a balance more favourable to developing countries in the sharing of the advantages resulting from
this expansion, through, in the largest possible measure, a substantial
improvement in the conditions of access for the products of interest to the
developing countries and, wherever appropriate, measures designed to attain stable, equitable and remunerative prices for primary products.
Article 15
All States have the duty to promote the achievement of general and
complete disarmament under effective international control and to utilize
the resources released by effective disarmament measures for the economic
and social development of countries, allocating a substantial portion of
such resources as additional means for the development needs of developing countries.
Article 16
1. It is the right and duty of all States, individually and collectively,
to eliminate colonialism, apartheid,racial discrimination, neo-colonialism
and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation and domination, and the
economic and social consequences thereof, as a pre-requisite for development. States which practise such coercive policies are economically responsible to the countries, territories and peoples affected for the restitution and full compensation for the exploitation and depletion of, and damages to, the natural and all other resources of those countries, territories
and peoples. It is the duty of all States to extend assistance to them.
2. No State has the right to promote or encourage investments that
may constitute an obstacle to the liberation of a territory occupied by
force.
Article 17
International co-operation for development is the shared goal and common duty of all States. Every State should co-operate with the efforts of
developing countries to accelerate their economic and social development
by providing favourable external conditions and by extending active assistance to them, consistent with their development needs and objectives,
with strict respect for the sovereign equality of States and free of any
conditions derogating from their sovereignty.
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Article 18
Developed countries should extend, improve and enlarge the system of
generalized non-reciprocal and non-discriminatory tariff preferences to the
developing countries consistent with the relevant agreed conclusions and
relevant decisions as adopted on this subject, in the framework of the
competent international organizations. Developed countries should also
give serious consideration to the adoption of other differential measures,
in areas where this is feasible and appropriate and in ways which will
provide special and more favourable treatment, in order to meet the trade
and development needs of the developing countries. In the conduct of
international economic relations the developed countries should endeavor
to avoid measures having a negative effect on the development of the
national economies of the developing countries, as promoted by generalized tariff preferences and other generally agreed differential measures in
their favour.
Article 19
With a view to accelerating the economic growth of developing countries
and bridging the economic gap between developed and developing countries, developed countries should grant generalized preferential, nonreciprocal and non-discriminatory treatment to developing countries in
these fields of international economic co-operation where it may be
feasible.
Article 20
Developing countries should, in their efforts to increase their over-all
trade, give due attention to the possibility of expanding their grade with
socialist countries, by granting to these countries conditions for trade not
inferior to those granted normally to the developed market economy countries.
Article 21
Developing countries should endeavour to promote the expansion of
their mutual trade and to this end may, in accordance with the existing
and evolving provisions and procedures of international agreements where
applicable, grant trade preferences to other developing countries without
being obliged to extend such preferences to developed countries, provided
these arrangements do not constitute an impediment to general trade liberalization and expansion.

19761

U.N. ECONOMIC CHARTER
Article 22

1. All States should respond to the generally recognized or mutually
agreed development needs and objectives of developing countries by promoting increased net flows of real resources to the developing countries
from all sources, taking into account any obligations and commitments
undertaken by the States concerned, in order to reinforce the efforts of
developing countries to accelerate their economic and social development.
2. In this context, consistent with the aims and objectives mentioned
above and taking into account any obligations and commitments undertaken in this regard, it should be their endeavour to increase the net
amount of financial flows from official sources to developing countries and
to improve the terms and conditions thereof.
3. The flow of development assistance resources should include economic and technical assistance.
Article 23
To enhance the effective mobilization of their own resources, the developing countries should strengthen their economic co-operation and expand
their mutual trade so as to accelerate their economic and social development. All countries, especially developed countries, individually as well as
through the competent international organizations of which they are members, should provide appropriate and effective support and co-operation.
Article 24
All States have the duty to conduct their mutual economic relations in
a manner which takes into account the interests of other countries. In
particular, all States should avoid prejudicing the interests of developing
countries.
Article 25
In furtherance of world economic development, the international community, especially its developed members, shall pay special attention to
the particular needs and problems of the least developed among the developing countries, of land-locked developing countries and also island developing countries, with a view to helping them to overcome their particular
difficulties and thus contribute to their economic and social development.

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 27

Article 26
All States have the duty to coexist in tolerance and live together in
peace, irrespective of differences in political,'economic, social and cultural
systems, and to facilitate trade between States having different economic
and social systems. International trade should be conducted without prejudice to generalized non-discriminatory and non-reciprocal preferences in
favour of developing countries, on the basis of mutual advantage, equitable
benefits and the exchange of most favoured-nation treatment.
Article 27
1. Every State has the right to fully enjoy the benefits of world invisible
trade and to engage in the expansion of of such trade.
2. World invisible trade, based on efficiency and mutual and equitable
benefit, furthering the expansion of the world economy, is the common goal
of all States. The role of developing countries in world invisible trade
should be enhanced and strengthened consistent with the above objectives,
particular attention being paid to the special needs of developing countries.
3. All States should co-operate with developing countries in their endeavours to increase their capacity to earn foreign exchange from invisible
transactions, in accordance with the potential and needs of each developing country and consistent with the objectives mentioned above.
Article 28
All States have the duty to co-operate in achieving adjustments in the
prices of exports of developing countries in relation to prices of their im-ports so as to promote just and equitable terms of trade for them, in a
manner which is remunerative for producers and equitable for producers
and consumers.
CHAPTER III
Common responsibilitiestowards the internationalcommunity
Article 29
The sea-bed and ocean floor and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits
of national jurisdiction, as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind. On the basis of the principles adopted by the
General Assembly in resolution 2749 (XXV) of 17 December 1970, all
States shall ensure that the exploration of its resources are carried out
exclusively for peaceful purposes and that the benefits derived therefrom
are shared equitably by all States, taking into account the particular inter-
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ests and needs of developing countries; and international regime applying
to the area and its resources and including appropriate international
machinery to give effect to its provisions shall be established by an international treaty of a universal character, generally agreed upon.
Article 30
The protection, preservation and the enhancement of the environment
for the present and future generations is the responsibility of all States. All
States shall endeavour to establish their own environmental and developmental policies in conformity with such responsibility. The environmental
policies of all States should enhance and not adversely affect the present
and future development potential of developing countries. All States have
the responsibility to ensure that activities within the jurisdiction or control
do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction. All States should co-operate in evolving
international norms and regulations in the field of the environment.
CHAPTER IV
Final provisions
Article 31
All States have the duty to contribute to the balanced expansion of the
world economy, taking duly into account the close interrelationship between the well-being of the developed countries and the growth development of the developing countries, and that the prosperity of the international community as a whole depends upon the prosperity of its constituent
parts.
Article 32
No State may use or encourage the use of economic, political or any
other type of measures to coerce another State in order to obtain from it
the subordination of the exercise of its sovereign rights.
Article 33
1. Nothing in the present Charter shall be construed as impairing or
derogating from the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations or
actions taken in pursuance thereof.
2. In their interpretation and application, the provisions of the present
Charter are interrelated and each provision should be construed in the
context of the other provisions.
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Article 34
An item on the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States shall
be included on the agenda of the General Assembly at its thirtieth session,
and thereafter on the agenda of every fifth session. In this way a systematic
and comprehensive consideration of the implementation of the Charter,
covering both progress achieved and any improvements and additions
which might become necessary, would be carried out and appropriate measures recommended. Such consideration should take into account the evolution of all the economic, social, legal and other factors related to the
principles upon which the present Charter is based and on its purpose.

